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    1. A non-inflicting competitor may not disclose its rivals’ 
conspicuous acts if the disclosure negatively influences its profit 
(Chapter 2).  
    2. Regulatory policies that implement full information acquisition 
and disclosure may be welfare reducing if the information value is 
lower than the acquisition cost (Chapter 2).  
    3. Individual sanctions may keep an employee from participating 
in unlawful collusion given that the interest of the employee is not 
always aligned with that of her employer (Chapter 3).  
    4. Cheap talk cannot reduce the inefficiency caused by 
informational asymmetry in a complicated strategic environment 
(Chapter 4).  
    5. Good policy should generate the desired effects and avoid the 
undesired side effects if possible.  
    6. The less informed party may take advantage of the conflict of 
interests among the informed to get the wanted information.  
    7. An intention of communication does not necessarily lead to a 
successful communication.  
    8. When inefficiency due to information asymmetry cannot be 
eliminated by the market, government intervention may be needed.  
    9. To understand human behavior, we have to know the incentive 
she has and the constraint she faces.  
 
